From Jerusalem to Nazi Berlin - The Mufti of Jerusalem and Hitler Partnership
FROM STATION Z TO JERUSALEM
It began as another normal
summer day in June 1942 at the Sachsenhausen concentration camp near Berlin , the place where SS trainees were taken to see how
the Master Race’s captive enemies should be treated.1 Three barracks in a
separate section housed Jewish prisoners, mainly Polish
citizens or men deported from
Berlin . On that particular day, a squad of shouting guards
ordered the Jewish prisoners of Barrack 38 to line up for four special visitors
participating in an SS tour.2
As a model SS facility
Sachsenhausen was run with the utmost efficiency and discretion. Whenever a
prisoner was murdered or died, the nearby town’s officials filled out a routine
death certificate, as if his passage from life had been an ordinary one. Only
the wafting smell of death from the
cremation chimneys suggested
otherwise.3 Yet this visit was handled with even greater care. Fritz Grobba,
the Nazi regime’s chief Middle East expert and liaison with its Arab allies,
emphasized the event’s importance. Everything must be perfect.4 So seriously
did the Reich’s leadership take this occasion that SS chief Heinrich Himmler
personally drove to Sachsenhausen beforehand and took the planned tour himself.
The timing was carefully
selected. In May, just one month earlier, the Germans had begun a new project
in Sachsenhausen that they wanted to show off to their allies. It was codenamed
Station Z. The choice of the letter “Z,” the alphabet’s last letter, was to
symbolize that this place would mark the end of the road for Jews, not only in
Sachsenhausen but throughout Europe .
For years, the Nazis had
experimented with the best method for exterminating Jews and others. Starting
with individual hangings, they moved on to shooting people in groups, more
efficient but still slow. The breakthrough in mass producing death came in 1941
with the development of camouflaged gas chambers. These had just been installed
at Sachsenhausen along with four new crematoria to speed up disposal of
corpses. In May, Himmler ordered the killing of 250 Jews in the camp as a test
run. The system worked flawlessly.5
And so, in June 1941, four
special Arab guests visited the prototype for future death camps. Their
interest had a very practical purpose. One day, they planned to create their
own Station Z’s in the Middle
East near Tunis , Baghdad ,
and Jericho to eliminate all the Jews in the region.
That goal had been set in a
January 1941 letter that Amin al-Husaini, the Palestine Arab political and
religious leader, sent German Chancellor Adolf Hitler. Al-Husaini asked Hitler
to help Arabs solve the Jewish question in their lands the way it was being
done in Germany.6 To succeed they must learn the Nazis’ techniques and obtain
their technology.
This was why four officials
from Germany ’s Arab allies were at Sachsenhausen in June 1942,
preparing for the day they would return home behind Hitler’s army. One
interpretation of the documents has been that they were all aides, one of
al-Husaini and three working for Germany ’s other
main Arab ally, Rashid Ali
al-Kailani, Iraq ’s former ruler who had been overthrown by a British
invasion the previous year and fled to Berlin . The delegation’s Palestinian Arab member would have
been either al-Husaini’s security adviser, Safwat al-Husaini, or another nephew,
Musa al-Husaini, who handled propaganda and agitation.
Another interpretation,
however, is more dramatic: the four visitors might have included Germany ’s two main Arab allies in person--al-Husaini and
al-Kailani--each with one aide. The evidence points to at least al-Kailani’s
personal presence.7 Grobba had written, “There shouldn’t be concerns
about the participation of
al-Kailani himself in this inspection.”8 Foreign Ministry Under Secretary
Martin Luther asked “Why al-Kailani and his entourage had visited that camp.”9
The visitors most likely, then, included al-Kailani, an Iraqi and a Palestinian
Arab whom their bosses had assigned to the SS course, along with either a
second Iraqi assistant or, less probably, al-Husaini himself.
Figure 1. On July 15, 1942 , at his East Prussian headquarters near Rastenburg,
Hitler meets the former Iraqi premier Rashid Ali al-Kailani, a member of the
al-Qadiriyya brotherhood, which together with seven similar Islamist
organizations played a key role in Berlin ’s Middle
East policy from 1894 on. On
May
15, 1942 , al-Kailani promised
Hitler in a secret letter “to fight the common enemy until final victory.”
Whether or not he personally
visited the death camp on that occasion, the grand mufti emerged as Nazi
Germany’s main Arab and Muslim ally. He and his entourage had first fled
British arrest for stirring a bloody revolt in Palestine , and had then--after a stay as al-Kailani’s guest in Baghdad --fled
to Germany ahead of the British army. On November 28,
1941 , Hitler gave al-Husaini
a long audience as a mark of special favor, during which they agreed to
cooperate in committing genocide against the Jews.
The path leading to that
moment started in 1871, when Prussia led neighboring states into the creation of a united Germany . Arab intellectuals later saw this as a model for
doing the same thing. Before World War I , Germany ’s monarch, the kaiser portrayed himself as patron of
Muslims and Arabs. During the war, Germany fomented a jihad to encourage Muslims to fight on its
side.
After the war, the thinking
of Hitler and al-Husaini had developed along parallel lines. Both the grand
mufti and Hitler developed the idea that only exterminating the Jews would let
them achieve their goals.10 The two men each sought allies with a similar
worldview.11 When Hitler became Germany’s chancellor in 1933, the grand mufti
visited the German consulate in Jerusalem to offer cooperation. That same year,
Hitler’s autobiography, Mein Kampf, was serialized in Arab newspapers and
became a best-selling book.
Nazi Germany and its ideology
became popular among Arabs for many reasons. They, too, saw themselves as a
weak, defeated, and humiliated people, much like the Germans after World War I.
In addition, many Arabs hoped
to copy Nazi Germany’s seemingly magic formula for quickly becoming strong and
victorious by having a powerful government mobilizing the masses by passionate
patriotism, militant ideology, and hatred of scapegoats. That fascist Italy offered the same model reinforced the idea.
The grand mufti later wrote
that many Arabs proclaimed, “Thank goodness, al-Hajj Muhammad Hitler has
come.”12 The regimes that would later rule Iraq for forty years, Syria for fifty years, and Egypt for sixty years were all established by groups and
leaders who had been Nazi sympathizers.
The alliance between these
two forces was logical. Al-Husaini’s 1936-39 Palestinian Arab rebellion
received weapons from Berlin and money from Rome . In 1937, he urged Muslims to kill all the Jews
living in Muslim lands, calling them “scum and germs.”13 But al-Husaini’s ambitions
went further. He wanted German backing not only to wipe out the Jews in the Middle East but also to make him ruler over all Arabs. In exchange for Berlin ’s backing, he pledged to bring the Muslims and Arabs
into an alliance with Germany ; spread Nazi ideology; promote German trade; and
“wage terror,” in his own words, against the British and French.
The Nazis were eager for this
partnership. They established special relationships with the Muslim
Brotherhood, the Ba’th Party, the Young Egypt movement, and radical factions in
Syria , Iraq , and Palestine . Berlin
also hoped to build links with the kings of Egypt and Saudi Arabia .
In 1939, for example, Hitler
met Saudi King Abd al-Aziz Ibn Saud’s envoy, Khalid al-Qarqani, telling him:
“We view the Arabs with the warmest sympathy for three reasons. First, we do
not pursue any territorial aspirations in Arab lands. Second, we have the same
enemies. And third, we both fight against the Jews. I will not rest until the
very last of them has left Germany .”
Al-Qarqani agreed, saying
that the prophet Muhammad had acted similarly in driving all the Jews out of Arabia .
A Muslim could make no more flattering comparison. Hitler asked al-Qarqani to
tell his king that Germany wanted an alliance and would arm both Saudi Arabia and al-Husaini’s men.14
But first, Hitler had to
decide precisely how “the very last” of the Jews were to leave Germany . As late as 1941, Hitler thought this could happen,
in the words of Hermann Goering in July, by “emigration or evacuation.”15 Yet since
other countries refused to take many or any Jewish refugees, Palestine was the only possible refuge, as designated by the League of Nations in 1922. If that last safe haven was closed, mass
murder would be Hitler’s only alternative.
The importance of the
Arab-Muslim alliance for Berlin ,
along with the grand mufti’s urging, ensured that outcome. And al-Husaini would
be present at the critical moment Hitler chose it. In November 1941, al-Husaini
arrived in Berlin to a reception showing the Germans saw him as future
leader of all Arabs and Muslims, perhaps even reviver of the Islamic caliphate.
He was housed in the luxurious Castle Bellevue, once home to Germany ’s crown prince and today the official residence of Germany ’s president.
Al-Husaini was paid for his
personal and political needs an amount equivalent to about twelve million
dollars a year in today’s values.16 The funds were raised by selling gold
seized from Jews sent to concentration camps.17 Following this pattern,
al-Husaini requested and received as his office an expropriated Jewish
apartment. His staff was housed in a half-dozen other houses provided by the
Germans. In addition, al-Husaini was given a suite in Berlin ’s splendid Hotel Adlon and, for vacations, luxurious
accommodations at the Hotel Zittau and Oybin Castle in Saxony.18
On the German side, Grobba
was his guide and handler; Ernst von Weizsäcker, a state secretary and SS
general, his liaison with the Foreign Ministry. Von Weizsäcker preferred
courting Turkey rather than the Arabs since it had a large
army--thirty-six brigades easily expandable to fifty--while all Arab countries
combined had just seven, and those mostly under British officers.19
Figure 2. Hitler in conversation with Grand Mufti al-Hajj Amin
al-Husaini, November 28, 1941 . At their meeting they concluded the pact
of Jewish genocide in Europe
and the Middle East , and immediately afterward, Hitler gave
the order to prepare for the Holocaust. The next day invitations went
out to thirteen
Nazis for the Wannsee Conference to begin organizing the logistics of this mass
murder.
But Hitler had a
higher opinion of the grand mufti’s value. All his other Arab or Muslim
partners had followers in just one country; al-Husaini had transnational
influence. The grand mufti sought to prove himself worthy of these high
expectations. At the Bellevue , he met not only Arab politicians but also exiled Muslim
leaders from the USSR , India , Afghanistan , and the Balkans.
Foreign Minister
Joachim von Ribbentrop was impressed, telling al-Husaini, “We have watched your
fight for a long time. We have always admired you, fascinated by your dangerous
adventures…” Von Ribbentrop assured al-Husaini of the Reich’s support.20 The
Germans accepted al-Husaini’s claim that the Arab masses would rally to their
side if Berlin guaranteed independence from British and
French rule as well as stopping all Jewish immigration into Palestine . In March 1941, Berlin secretly promised to support Arab
independence.21 In October, Berlin and Rome publicly announced that policy.22
Among themselves, German
officials called al-Husaini the most important Muslim cleric and leader of the
Arabs in Lebanon , Syria , Palestine ,
Transjordan (today Jordan ), Iraq , and elsewhere.23
Hitler called him the
“principal actor of the Middle
East , a realist, not a
dreamer.”24 A contemporary U.S. intelligence assessment agreed, claiming al-Husaini
was seen throughout the Middle
East as “the greatest leader
of the Arab peoples now alive.”25
In recognition of this
estimate, Hitler gave al-Husaini a ninety-minute meeting on November 28,
1941 . Hitler’s preparatory
briefing, written by Grobba, stressed that al-Husaini was in tune with Germany ’s ideological and strategic interests.26 The red
carpet was rolled out with the Nazi regime’s
considerable talent for
dramatic pomp. The grand mufti stepped from his limousine to see a
two-hundred-man honor guard and a band playing military music. Hitler greeted
him warmly, “I am most familiar with your life.”
His Arab guest returned the
compliments, pleased to find Hitler not only a powerful speaker but also a
patient listener. Al-Husaini thanked the German dictator for long supporting
the Palestinian Arab cause. The Arabs, he asserted, were Germany ’s natural friends, believed it would win the war,
and were ready to help.
Al-Husaini explained his plan to Hitler. He would recruit an Arab Legion to
fight for the Axis; Arab fighters would sabotage Allied facilities while Arab
and Muslim leaders would foment revolts to tie up Allied troops and add
territory and resources for the Axis.
Hitler accepted, saying the
alliance would help his life-and-death struggle with the two citadels of Jewish
power: Great
Britain
and Soviet Russia. At that moment, the Third Reich was at the height of its
victories. German forces were advancing deep inside the Soviet Union and nearer its border with Iran . General Erwin Rommel was moving into Egypt and many Egyptians thought Cairo might soon fall. When the day of German victory came,
Hitler continued, Germany would announce the Arabs’ liberation. The grand mufti
would become leader of most Arabs. All Jews in the Middle East would be killed.27 When al-Husaini asked for a written agreement,
Hitler replied that he had just given him his personal promise and that should
be sufficient.28
For al-Husaini, the meeting
could not have gone better. Not only was the might of triumphant Germany , Europe ’s master, sponsoring the Arab cause, but the world’s
most powerful man was backing him personally. Hitler was also pleased.
Afterward, he called al-Husaini “the principal actor in the Middle East ,” a sly fox, a realist, and--with his blond hair and blue eyes--an
Aryan, too. And so Hitler forgave al-Husaini what the German leader called his
sharp and mouse-like countenance.29
ed that al-Husaini was no
mere Arab but a Circassian, thus a Caucasian, and hence an Aryan. His
pseudoscientific diagnosis rested on distinctively unphysical reasoning. An
Arab could never have kept up the battle against the British and Jews, the doctor
explained, but would have sold out to
them. Al-Husaini’s
steadfastness proved he was an Aryan. And since he was an Aryan he would be a
faithful ally for Nazi Germany.30
But there was another
consequence of the al-Husaini-Hitler meeting to cement their alliance. A few
hours after seeing the grand mufti Hitler ordered invitations sent for a
conference to be held at a villa on Lake Wannsee . The meeting’s purpose was to plan the comprehensive
extermination of all Europe ’s Jews.
Considerations of Muslim and
Arab alliances, of course, were by no means the sole factor in a decision that
grew from Hitler’s own anti-Semitic obsession. But until that moment the German
dictator had left open the chance that expulsion might be an alternative to
extermination.
When Hitler first told
Heydrich to find a “final solution,” the dictator had included expelling the
Jews as an option. Already, the regime estimated. it had let about 500,000 Jews
leave Germany legally during seven years of Nazi rule. Yet if the
remaining Jews could only go to Palestine , and since
ending that immigration was
al-Husaini’s top priority, emigration or expulsion would sabotage the
German-Arab alliance.31 Given the combination of the strategic situation and
Hitler’s personal views, choosing to kill the Jews and gain the Arab and Muslim
assets necessary for his war effort was an easy decision.32
Consequently, Hitler ordered
the Wannsee Conference to devise a detailed plan for genocide.33 Since this
decision was linked to the alliance with al-Husaini he would be the first
non-German informed about the plan, even before it was formally presented at
the conference. Adolf Eichmann himself was assigned to this task.
Eichmann briefed al-Husaini
in the SS headquarters map room, using the presentation prepared for the
conference. The grand mufti, Eichmann’s aide recalled, was very impressed, so
taken with this blueprint for genocide that al-Husaini asked Eichmann to send
an expert--probably Dieter Wisliceny--to Jerusalem to be his own personal adviser for setting up death
camps and gas chambers once Germany won the war and he was in power.34
As a first step, it was
agreed that once Rommel captured Egypt, an SS unit commanded by Walther Rauff,
Heydrich’s thirty-five-year-old aide who had developed mobile gassing vans,
would arrive in Cairo to eliminate the Jews there before following the
Wehrmacht into Palestine for an encore.35 In June 1942, Rauff did begin this
project, killing twenty-five hundred Jews in German occupied Tunisia. If the
Germans had taken Egypt and then Palestine , this would have been the rehearsal for larger
operations. With German armies approaching the Middle East near the Libya Egypt and Soviet-Iran borders, the idea that within a
year German-advised Arabs might have murdered all of the Jews in the region
seemed realistic.
And that was why an Arab
delegation was invited for a preview at the Sachsenhausen camp. They were
briefed by the camp’s SS commander, Colonel Hans Loritz, who, with eight years’
experience, was the Reich’s top expert in running concentration camps. After
fielding questions he led the tour of the barracks, eating halls, washrooms,
kitchens, and dispensary. Leaving nothing to chance, the Germans had prepared a
dramatic event. A group of sixty Soviet officers, singing enthusiastically,
marched out of the camp dressed in new German army uniforms. These were, Loritz
explained, prisoners of war who had volunteered to fight the Communist
regime.36 The guests got the message. Everyone wanted to be on the winning
side, and if Germany could turn Soviet officers against Stalin, Arabs
could recruit Muslims to fight Churchill.
One German official, however,
was horrified by that visit. The Foreign Ministry’s undersecretary, Martin
Luther, demanded that Arabs not be allowed into any concentration camp lest
they tell others about what they saw. If Germany ’s enemies discovered mass murder was happening they
would use this as a propaganda weapon against the Third Reich.
Luther, a party veteran, also
worried that leaks would sabotage his job of convincing German satellite or
allied states to turn over their Jews for transport to the death camps. If word
got out, those regimes might balk at cooperating due either to Allied pressure
or to fear of future punishment.37 Infuriated, Luther complained to Grobba that
von Ribbentrop had promised him the visit wouldn’t happen.38 Luther’s request
to suspend this particular tour was denied.39 The SS promised him there would
be no more tours in future but held them anyway, including a likely later visit
by al-Husaini to Auschwitz.40 As for Luther, in 1943 he went too far in
conspiring to replace von Ribbentrop’s job and was sent to Sachsenhausen
himself.
The importance of Nazi
Germany’s connections with Arab and Muslim allies was quite clear to Hitler and
most of his lieutenants. They saw this alliance as vital to their war effort
and the key to conquering the Middle
East . Hitler thought
al-Husaini would emerge as leader of a vast Arab empire that would be his
junior partner. Yet what was the background of this German fixation with Arab
revolts and Islamic jihad, and precisely how did this alliance develop on both
sides?
* The late Barry Rubin was
director of the Global Research in International Affairs (GLORIA) Center of the
Interdisciplinary Center, Israel. He was the author of many books and published
frequently on Middle East topics.
*Middle East historian Wolfgang G. Schwanitz is visiting professor at the Global
Research in International Affairs Center of the Interdisciplinary Center, Israel, and a
Hochberg Family Writing fellow at the Middle East Forum of Philadelphia,
Pennsylvania. He lives in New Jersey .
NOTES
1 ParchAA, R100702. From a
July 28, 1942, note by Fritz Grobba we infer that the visit described here took
place between June 26 and July 17, 1942.
2 According to one document, the visitors were “three of
al-Kailani’s men.” Grobba said it was “three staffers of al-Kailani and one of
al-Husaini” and on a third occasion the document referred to “four Arabs.”
PArchAA, R100702, F1784-85,
Zu Pol VII 6447g
II, B611978, “Notiz für
Gesandschaftsrat Granow,
drei Begleiter al-Kailanis,bedauerlich, zumal
Herr RAM sich angeschlossen hat,
solche Einrichtungen nicht
zu zeigen, Berlin , 06.06.1942,
gez. Gödde.”
PArchAA, R100702, F1784-85,
Zu Pol VII 6447g I Metropol: I, B611979.
3 Günter Morsch and Astrid
Ley, eds., Das Konzentrationslager Sachsenhausen 1936-1945 (Berlin : Metropol, 2008), 170, 176, 178.
4 On the visit of four Arabs
to the concentration camp ‘Sachsenhausen’ near Oranienburg,” Berlin , July 17, 1942 . See also Wolfgang G. Schwanitz, ed., Germany and the Middle East ,
1871-1945 (Princeton : Wiener, 2004), 218-220.
5 Morsch and Ley, Das
Konzentrationslager Sachsenhausen, 101-110.
6 Amin al-Husaini,
Mudhakkirat al-Hajj Muhammad Amin al-Husaini [The memoirs of al-Hajj Muhammad
Amin al-Husaini], ed. Abd al-Karim al-Umar (Damascus: Al-Ahali, 1999), 74.
7 PArchAA, R100702, F1784-85,
“Wunsch Kailanis ein KZ zu besichtigen, Berlin , 6/26/42 ,
gez. Grobba.”
8 PArchAA, R100702, F1784-85,
“Wunsch Kailanis ein KZ zu besichtigen, Berlin , 6/26/42 ,
gez. Grobba.”
9 PArchAA, R100702, F1784-85,
Zu Pol VII 6447g II, B611976, “Notiz für Herrn Grobba (im Auftrag von U.St.S.
Martin Luther), Geheim , Berlin , 7/24/1942 , gez. Gödde.”
10 Adolf Hitler, Mein Kampf
(Boston: Mariner, 1999), 307; al-Husaini, Mudhakkirat, 94, 414-415. 11 Hitler,
Mein Kampf, 610, 619. 12.
12 Al-Husaini, Mudhakkirat,
73.
13 “Ein Angebot an die
zuständigen Stellen in Deutschland,” Akten zur Deutschen Auswärtigen
Politik, 63 vols.
(Baden-Baden: Imprimerie Nationale, 1950-1996), ser. D,5:655-656 (offer for
agreement, nine points by the Grand Mufti and Syrian Arabs); “Islam und
Judentum,” in Islam--Bolschewismus, ed. Muhammad Sabri (Berlin: Junker und
Dünnhaupt, 1938), 22-32 (grand mufti’s call to the Islamic world of 1937).
14 PArchAA, N6, R104795,
“Aufzeichnung, Empfang des Sondergesandten von König Abdul Aziz Ibn Saud auf
dem Berghofe des Königlichen Rats Khalid Al Hudal-Qarqani, Berlin 20.06.1939, gez. Hentig.”
15 PArchWGS, Jewish Question,
Hermann Göring to Reinhard
Heydrich , Berlin , July 31, 1941 , signed Göring.
16 PArchWGS,
Office Of Chief
Of Counsel For
War Crimes, Doc.
No. NG-5462-5570, Eidesstattliche
Erklärung (sworn statement on financial affairs of Germany ’s Arab guests), Carl Rekowski, Bremen , October 5, 1947 , 1-10.
17 Wolfgang G. Schwanitz, Gold, Bankiers und
Diplomaten: Zur Geschichte der Deutschen Orientbank 1906-1946 (Berlin : Trafo, 2002), 100, 113, 148, 299.
18 Al-Husaini, Mudhakkirat,
104.
19 Ibid., 107.
20 Ibid., 105.
21 USArchII, T120, R901,
F61123, “Entwurf eines dem Sekretär des Großmuftis mitzugebenden Schreibens im
Namen des Führers als Antwort auf den Brief vom 20.01.1941, geheim, Berlin , März 1941 [later dated April 8, 1941 ], gez. Weizsäcker.”
22 German-Italian broadcast
declaration on Arab independence, aired October 21, 1941 .
23 USArchII, T120, R901,
F61123, “Die Person des Großmufti, geheime Reichssache , Berlin , März 1941,” 72-73.
24 H. R. Trevor-Roper,
Hitler’s Table Talk, 1941-1944, rev. ed. (New York : Enigma, 2008), 412.
25 USArchII, RG165, B3055, OSS code cablegram, “Grand Mufti, Cairo , confidential,” May 19, 1941 .
26 USArchII, T120, R63571,
R50682, “Der Großmufti von Jerusalem,” Berlin , 11/28/41”; al-Husaini, Mudhakkirat, 108.
27 Al-Husaini, Mudhakkirat,
113.
28 Ibid.
29 Trevor-Roper, Hitler’s
Table Talk, 412.
30 BArchPAA, F56474, Bericht,
351003-351007.
31 Corry Guttstadt, Die
Türkei, die Juden und der Holocaust (Hamburg : Assoziation A, 2008), 248, 256.
32 Ibid.
33 PArchWGS, protocol of the Wannsee Conference , Berlin -Wannsee, January 20, 1942 , online at
http://www.ghwk.de/fileadmin/user_upload/pdf-wannsee/protokoll-januar1942.pdf.
34 “Betr. Grossmufti von
Jerusalem,” written statement by Wisliceny at Nuremberg, July 26, 1946, in
Wolfgang G. Schwanitz, Amin al-Husaini
und das Dritte Reich(Lawrenceville , N.J. , 2008),
http://www.trafoberlin.de/pdf-Neu/Amin%20al-
Husaini%20und%20das%20Dritte%20Reich%20WGS.pdf,
1-10.
35 Wolfgang G. Schwanitz:
“Amin al-Husaini and the Holocaust: What Did the Grand Mufti Know?” World
Politics Review Exclusive, May 8, 2008 ,
http://www.trafoberlin.de/pdf-Neu/Amin%20al-Husaini%20and%20the%20Holocaust.pdf,1-10.
36 Schwanitz, Germany and the Middle East ,
218-220.
37 Morsch and Ley, Das
Konzentrationslager Sachsenhausen, 174.
38 PArchAA, R100702,
F1784-85, Zu Pol VII 6447g II, B611976.
39 PArchAA, R100702,
F1784-85, Zu Pol VII 6447g II, B611977.
40 Astrid Ley and Günther
Morsch, eds., Medizin und Verbrechen: Das Krankenrevier des KZ Sachsenhausen
1936-1945 (Berlin : Metropol, 2007), 391-392.
Hitler.
Citing relevant history is hardly inflammatory. Indeed, it’s extremely enlightening. What else could explain the virulence of Arab hatred toward Jews but idological interbreeding with Nazis?