From Jerusalem to Nazi Berlin - The Mufti of Jerusalem and Hitler Partnership - Draiman

From Jerusalem to Nazi Berlin - The Mufti of Jerusalem and Hitler Partnership

FROM STATION Z TO JERUSALEM

It began as another normal summer day in June 1942 at the Sachsenhausen concentration camp near Berlin, the place where SS trainees were taken to see how the Master Race’s captive enemies should be treated.1 Three barracks in a separate section housed Jewish prisoners, mainly Polish

citizens or men deported from Berlin. On that particular day, a squad of shouting guards ordered the Jewish prisoners of Barrack 38 to line up for four special visitors participating in an SS tour.2

As a model SS facility Sachsenhausen was run with the utmost efficiency and discretion. Whenever a prisoner was murdered or died, the nearby town’s officials filled out a routine death certificate, as if his passage from life had been an ordinary one. Only the wafting smell of death from the

cremation chimneys suggested otherwise.3 Yet this visit was handled with even greater care. Fritz Grobba, the Nazi regime’s chief Middle East expert and liaison with its Arab allies, emphasized the event’s importance. Everything must be perfect.4 So seriously did the Reich’s leadership take this occasion that SS chief Heinrich Himmler personally drove to Sachsenhausen beforehand and took the planned tour himself.

The timing was carefully selected. In May, just one month earlier, the Germans had begun a new project in Sachsenhausen that they wanted to show off to their allies. It was codenamed Station Z. The choice of the letter “Z,” the alphabet’s last letter, was to symbolize that this place would mark the end of the road for Jews, not only in Sachsenhausen but throughout Europe.

For years, the Nazis had experimented with the best method for exterminating Jews and others. Starting with individual hangings, they moved on to shooting people in groups, more efficient but still slow. The breakthrough in mass producing death came in 1941 with the development of camouflaged gas chambers. These had just been installed at Sachsenhausen along with four new crematoria to speed up disposal of corpses. In May, Himmler ordered the killing of 250 Jews in the camp as a test run. The system worked flawlessly.5

And so, in June 1941, four special Arab guests visited the prototype for future death camps. Their interest had a very practical purpose. One day, they planned to create their own Station Z’s in the Middle East near Tunis, Baghdad, and Jericho to eliminate all the Jews in the region.

That goal had been set in a January 1941 letter that Amin al-Husaini, the Palestine Arab political and religious leader, sent German Chancellor Adolf Hitler. Al-Husaini asked Hitler to help Arabs solve the Jewish question in their lands the way it was being done in Germany.6 To succeed they must learn the Nazis’ techniques and obtain their technology.

This was why four officials from Germany’s Arab allies were at Sachsenhausen in June 1942, preparing for the day they would return home behind Hitler’s army. One interpretation of the documents has been that they were all aides, one of al-Husaini and three working for Germany’s other

main Arab ally, Rashid Ali al-Kailani, Iraq’s former ruler who had been overthrown by a British invasion the previous year and fled to Berlin. The delegation’s Palestinian Arab member would have been either al-Husaini’s security adviser, Safwat al-Husaini, or another nephew, Musa al-Husaini, who handled propaganda and agitation.

Another interpretation, however, is more dramatic: the four visitors might have included Germany’s two main Arab allies in person--al-Husaini and al-Kailani--each with one aide. The evidence points to at least al-Kailani’s personal presence.7 Grobba had written, “There shouldn’t be concerns

about the participation of al-Kailani himself in this inspection.”8 Foreign Ministry Under Secretary Martin Luther asked “Why al-Kailani and his entourage had visited that camp.”9 The visitors most likely, then, included al-Kailani, an Iraqi and a Palestinian Arab whom their bosses had assigned to the SS course, along with either a second Iraqi assistant or, less probably, al-Husaini himself.

Figure 1. On July 15, 1942, at his East Prussian headquarters near Rastenburg, Hitler meets the former Iraqi premier Rashid Ali al-Kailani, a member of the al-Qadiriyya brotherhood, which together with seven similar Islamist organizations played a key role in Berlin’s Middle East policy from 1894 on. On May 15, 1942, al-Kailani promised Hitler in a secret letter “to fight the common enemy until final victory.”

Whether or not he personally visited the death camp on that occasion, the grand mufti emerged as Nazi Germany’s main Arab and Muslim ally. He and his entourage had first fled British arrest for stirring a bloody revolt in Palestine, and had then--after a stay as al-Kailani’s guest in Baghdad--fled

to Germany ahead of the British army. On November 28, 1941, Hitler gave al-Husaini a long audience as a mark of special favor, during which they agreed to cooperate in committing genocide against the Jews.

The path leading to that moment started in 1871, when Prussia led neighboring states into the creation of a united Germany. Arab intellectuals later saw this as a model for doing the same thing. Before World War I, Germany’s monarch, the kaiser portrayed himself as patron of Muslims and Arabs. During the war, Germany fomented a jihad to encourage Muslims to fight on its side.

After the war, the thinking of Hitler and al-Husaini had developed along parallel lines. Both the grand mufti and Hitler developed the idea that only exterminating the Jews would let them achieve their goals.10 The two men each sought allies with a similar worldview.11 When Hitler became Germany’s chancellor in 1933, the grand mufti visited the German consulate in Jerusalem to offer cooperation. That same year, Hitler’s autobiography, Mein Kampf, was serialized in Arab newspapers and became a best-selling book.

Nazi Germany and its ideology became popular among Arabs for many reasons. They, too, saw themselves as a weak, defeated, and humiliated people, much like the Germans after World War I.

Germany was also an enemy of Britain (which ruled Egypt, Sudan, Jordan, Palestine, and Iraq); France (which ruled North Africa, Lebanon, and Syria); and the USSR (which had large Muslim populated areas).

In addition, many Arabs hoped to copy Nazi Germany’s seemingly magic formula for quickly becoming strong and victorious by having a powerful government mobilizing the masses by passionate patriotism, militant ideology, and hatred of scapegoats. That fascist Italy offered the same model reinforced the idea.

The grand mufti later wrote that many Arabs proclaimed, “Thank goodness, al-Hajj Muhammad Hitler has come.”12 The regimes that would later rule Iraq for forty years, Syria for fifty years, and Egypt for sixty years were all established by groups and leaders who had been Nazi sympathizers.

The alliance between these two forces was logical. Al-Husaini’s 1936-39 Palestinian Arab rebellion received weapons from Berlin and money from Rome. In 1937, he urged Muslims to kill all the Jews living in Muslim lands, calling them “scum and germs.”13 But al-Husaini’s ambitions went further. He wanted German backing not only to wipe out the Jews in the Middle East but also to make him ruler over all Arabs. In exchange for Berlin’s backing, he pledged to bring the Muslims and Arabs into an alliance with Germany; spread Nazi ideology; promote German trade; and “wage terror,” in his own words, against the British and French.

The Nazis were eager for this partnership. They established special relationships with the Muslim Brotherhood, the Ba’th Party, the Young Egypt movement, and radical factions in Syria, Iraq, and Palestine. Berlin also hoped to build links with the kings of Egypt and Saudi Arabia.

In 1939, for example, Hitler met Saudi King Abd al-Aziz Ibn Saud’s envoy, Khalid al-Qarqani, telling him: “We view the Arabs with the warmest sympathy for three reasons. First, we do not pursue any territorial aspirations in Arab lands. Second, we have the same enemies. And third, we both fight against the Jews. I will not rest until the very last of them has left Germany.”

Al-Qarqani agreed, saying that the prophet Muhammad had acted similarly in driving all the Jews out of Arabia. A Muslim could make no more flattering comparison. Hitler asked al-Qarqani to tell his king that Germany wanted an alliance and would arm both Saudi Arabia and al-Husaini’s men.14

But first, Hitler had to decide precisely how “the very last” of the Jews were to leave Germany. As late as 1941, Hitler thought this could happen, in the words of Hermann Goering in July, by “emigration or evacuation.”15 Yet since other countries refused to take many or any Jewish refugees, Palestine was the only possible refuge, as designated by the League of Nations in 1922. If that last safe haven was closed, mass murder would be Hitler’s only alternative.

The importance of the Arab-Muslim alliance for Berlin, along with the grand mufti’s urging, ensured that outcome. And al-Husaini would be present at the critical moment Hitler chose it. In November 1941, al-Husaini arrived in Berlin to a reception showing the Germans saw him as future leader of all Arabs and Muslims, perhaps even reviver of the Islamic caliphate. He was housed in the luxurious Castle Bellevue, once home to Germany’s crown prince and today the official residence of Germany’s president.

Al-Husaini was paid for his personal and political needs an amount equivalent to about twelve million dollars a year in today’s values.16 The funds were raised by selling gold seized from Jews sent to concentration camps.17 Following this pattern, al-Husaini requested and received as his office an expropriated Jewish apartment. His staff was housed in a half-dozen other houses provided by the Germans. In addition, al-Husaini was given a suite in Berlin’s splendid Hotel Adlon and, for vacations, luxurious accommodations at the Hotel Zittau and Oybin Castle in Saxony.18

On the German side, Grobba was his guide and handler; Ernst von Weizsäcker, a state secretary and SS general, his liaison with the Foreign Ministry. Von Weizsäcker preferred courting Turkey rather than the Arabs since it had a large army--thirty-six brigades easily expandable to fifty--while all Arab countries combined had just seven, and those mostly under British officers.19

Figure 2. Hitler in conversation with Grand Mufti al-Hajj Amin al-Husaini, November 28, 1941. At their meeting they concluded the pact of Jewish genocide in Europe and the Middle East, and immediately afterward, Hitler gave the order to prepare for the Holocaust. The next day invitations went

out to thirteen Nazis for the Wannsee Conference to begin organizing the logistics of this mass murder.

But Hitler had a higher opinion of the grand mufti’s value. All his other Arab or Muslim partners had followers in just one country; al-Husaini had transnational influence. The grand mufti sought to prove himself worthy of these high expectations. At the Bellevue, he met not only Arab politicians but also exiled Muslim leaders from the USSR, India, Afghanistan, and the Balkans.

Foreign Minister Joachim von Ribbentrop was impressed, telling al-Husaini, “We have watched your fight for a long time. We have always admired you, fascinated by your dangerous adventures…” Von Ribbentrop assured al-Husaini of the Reich’s support.20 The Germans accepted al-Husaini’s claim that the Arab masses would rally to their side if Berlin guaranteed independence from British and French rule as well as stopping all Jewish immigration into Palestine. In March 1941, Berlin secretly promised to support Arab independence.21 In October, Berlin and Rome publicly announced that policy.22

Among themselves, German officials called al-Husaini the most important Muslim cleric and leader of the Arabs in Lebanon, Syria, Palestine, Transjordan (today Jordan), Iraq, and elsewhere.23

Hitler called him the “principal actor of the Middle East, a realist, not a dreamer.”24 A contemporary U.S. intelligence assessment agreed, claiming al-Husaini was seen throughout the Middle East as “the greatest leader of the Arab peoples now alive.”25

In recognition of this estimate, Hitler gave al-Husaini a ninety-minute meeting on November 28, 1941. Hitler’s preparatory briefing, written by Grobba, stressed that al-Husaini was in tune with Germany’s ideological and strategic interests.26 The red carpet was rolled out with the Nazi regime’s

considerable talent for dramatic pomp. The grand mufti stepped from his limousine to see a two-hundred-man honor guard and a band playing military music. Hitler greeted him warmly, “I am most familiar with your life.”

His Arab guest returned the compliments, pleased to find Hitler not only a powerful speaker but also a patient listener. Al-Husaini thanked the German dictator for long supporting the Palestinian Arab cause. The Arabs, he asserted, were Germany’s natural friends, believed it would win the war,

and were ready to help. Al-Husaini explained his plan to Hitler. He would recruit an Arab Legion to fight for the Axis; Arab fighters would sabotage Allied facilities while Arab and Muslim leaders would foment revolts to tie up Allied troops and add territory and resources for the Axis.

Hitler accepted, saying the alliance would help his life-and-death struggle with the two citadels of Jewish power: Great Britain and Soviet Russia. At that moment, the Third Reich was at the height of its victories. German forces were advancing deep inside the Soviet Union and nearer its border with Iran. General Erwin Rommel was moving into Egypt and many Egyptians thought Cairo might soon fall. When the day of German victory came, Hitler continued, Germany would announce the Arabs’ liberation. The grand mufti would become leader of most Arabs. All Jews in the Middle East would be killed.27 When al-Husaini asked for a written agreement, Hitler replied that he had just given him his personal promise and that should be sufficient.28

For al-Husaini, the meeting could not have gone better. Not only was the might of triumphant Germany, Europe’s master, sponsoring the Arab cause, but the world’s most powerful man was backing him personally. Hitler was also pleased. Afterward, he called al-Husaini “the principal actor in the Middle East,” a sly fox, a realist, and--with his blond hair and blue eyes--an Aryan, too. And so Hitler forgave al-Husaini what the German leader called his sharp and mouse-like countenance.29

Germany’s certification of the grand mufti as its candidate to be Arab and Muslim leader was confirmed in a uniquely Nazi manner. The day after the meeting, the grand mufti went to see a physician, Dr. Pierre Schrumpf, whose thorough physical checkup lasted six hours. The doctor conclud-

ed that al-Husaini was no mere Arab but a Circassian, thus a Caucasian, and hence an Aryan. His pseudoscientific diagnosis rested on distinctively unphysical reasoning. An Arab could never have kept up the battle against the British and Jews, the doctor explained, but would have sold out to

them. Al-Husaini’s steadfastness proved he was an Aryan. And since he was an Aryan he would be a faithful ally for Nazi Germany.30

But there was another consequence of the al-Husaini-Hitler meeting to cement their alliance. A few hours after seeing the grand mufti Hitler ordered invitations sent for a conference to be held at a villa on Lake Wannsee. The meeting’s purpose was to plan the comprehensive extermination of all Europe’s Jews.

Considerations of Muslim and Arab alliances, of course, were by no means the sole factor in a decision that grew from Hitler’s own anti-Semitic obsession. But until that moment the German dictator had left open the chance that expulsion might be an alternative to extermination.

When Hitler first told Heydrich to find a “final solution,” the dictator had included expelling the Jews as an option. Already, the regime estimated. it had let about 500,000 Jews leave Germany legally during seven years of Nazi rule. Yet if the remaining Jews could only go to Palestine, and since

ending that immigration was al-Husaini’s top priority, emigration or expulsion would sabotage the German-Arab alliance.31 Given the combination of the strategic situation and Hitler’s personal views, choosing to kill the Jews and gain the Arab and Muslim assets necessary for his war effort was an easy decision.32

Consequently, Hitler ordered the Wannsee Conference to devise a detailed plan for genocide.33 Since this decision was linked to the alliance with al-Husaini he would be the first non-German informed about the plan, even before it was formally presented at the conference. Adolf Eichmann himself was assigned to this task.

Eichmann briefed al-Husaini in the SS headquarters map room, using the presentation prepared for the conference. The grand mufti, Eichmann’s aide recalled, was very impressed, so taken with this blueprint for genocide that al-Husaini asked Eichmann to send an expert--probably Dieter Wisliceny--to Jerusalem to be his own personal adviser for setting up death camps and gas chambers once Germany won the war and he was in power.34

As a first step, it was agreed that once Rommel captured Egypt, an SS unit commanded by Walther Rauff, Heydrich’s thirty-five-year-old aide who had developed mobile gassing vans, would arrive in Cairo to eliminate the Jews there before following the Wehrmacht into Palestine for an encore.35 In June 1942, Rauff did begin this project, killing twenty-five hundred Jews in German occupied Tunisia. If the Germans had taken Egypt and then Palestine, this would have been the rehearsal for larger operations. With German armies approaching the Middle East near the Libya Egypt and Soviet-Iran borders, the idea that within a year German-advised Arabs might have murdered all of the Jews in the region seemed realistic.

And that was why an Arab delegation was invited for a preview at the Sachsenhausen camp. They were briefed by the camp’s SS commander, Colonel Hans Loritz, who, with eight years’ experience, was the Reich’s top expert in running concentration camps. After fielding questions he led the tour of the barracks, eating halls, washrooms, kitchens, and dispensary. Leaving nothing to chance, the Germans had prepared a dramatic event. A group of sixty Soviet officers, singing enthusiastically, marched out of the camp dressed in new German army uniforms. These were, Loritz explained, prisoners of war who had volunteered to fight the Communist regime.36 The guests got the message. Everyone wanted to be on the winning side, and if Germany could turn Soviet officers against Stalin, Arabs could recruit Muslims to fight Churchill.

One German official, however, was horrified by that visit. The Foreign Ministry’s undersecretary, Martin Luther, demanded that Arabs not be allowed into any concentration camp lest they tell others about what they saw. If Germany’s enemies discovered mass murder was happening they would use this as a propaganda weapon against the Third Reich.

Luther, a party veteran, also worried that leaks would sabotage his job of convincing German satellite or allied states to turn over their Jews for transport to the death camps. If word got out, those regimes might balk at cooperating due either to Allied pressure or to fear of future punishment.37 Infuriated, Luther complained to Grobba that von Ribbentrop had promised him the visit wouldn’t happen.38 Luther’s request to suspend this particular tour was denied.39 The SS promised him there would be no more tours in future but held them anyway, including a likely later visit by al-Husaini to Auschwitz.40 As for Luther, in 1943 he went too far in conspiring to replace von Ribbentrop’s job and was sent to Sachsenhausen himself.

The importance of Nazi Germany’s connections with Arab and Muslim allies was quite clear to Hitler and most of his lieutenants. They saw this alliance as vital to their war effort and the key to conquering the Middle East. Hitler thought al-Husaini would emerge as leader of a vast Arab empire that would be his junior partner. Yet what was the background of this German fixation with Arab revolts and Islamic jihad, and precisely how did this alliance develop on both sides?

* The late Barry Rubin was director of the Global Research in International Affairs (GLORIA) Center of the Interdisciplinary Center, Israel. He was the author of many books and published frequently on Middle East topics.

*Middle East historian Wolfgang G. Schwanitz is visiting professor at the Global Research in International Affairs Center of the Interdisciplinary Center, Israel, and a Hochberg Family Writing fellow at the Middle East Forum of Philadelphia, Pennsylvania. He lives in New Jersey.

NOTES

1 ParchAA, R100702. From a July 28, 1942, note by Fritz Grobba we infer that the visit described here took place between June 26 and July 17, 1942.

2        According to one document, the visitors were “three of al-Kailani’s men.” Grobba said it was “three staffers of al-Kailani and one of al-Husaini” and on a third occasion the document referred to “four  Arabs.”  PArchAA,  R100702,  F1784-85,  Zu  Pol  VII 6447g  II,  B611978, “Notiz  für

Gesandschaftsrat  Granow,  drei  Begleiter  al-Kailanis,bedauerlich,  zumal  Herr  RAM  sich angeschlossen  hat,  solche  Einrichtungen  nicht  zu  zeigen,  Berlin, 06.06.1942,  gez.  Gödde.”

PArchAA, R100702, F1784-85, Zu Pol VII 6447g I Metropol: I, B611979.

3 Günter Morsch and Astrid Ley, eds., Das Konzentrationslager Sachsenhausen 1936-1945 (Berlin: Metropol, 2008), 170, 176, 178.

4 On the visit of four Arabs to the concentration camp ‘Sachsenhausen’ near Oranienburg,” Berlin, July 17, 1942. See also Wolfgang G. Schwanitz, ed., Germany and the Middle East, 1871-1945 (Princeton: Wiener, 2004), 218-220.

5 Morsch and Ley, Das Konzentrationslager Sachsenhausen, 101-110.

6 Amin al-Husaini, Mudhakkirat al-Hajj Muhammad Amin al-Husaini [The memoirs of al-Hajj Muhammad Amin al-Husaini], ed. Abd al-Karim al-Umar (Damascus: Al-Ahali, 1999), 74.

7 PArchAA, R100702, F1784-85, “Wunsch Kailanis ein KZ zu besichtigen, Berlin, 6/26/42, gez. Grobba.”

8 PArchAA, R100702, F1784-85, “Wunsch Kailanis ein KZ zu besichtigen, Berlin, 6/26/42, gez. Grobba.”

9 PArchAA, R100702, F1784-85, Zu Pol VII 6447g II, B611976, “Notiz für Herrn Grobba (im Auftrag von U.St.S. Martin Luther), Geheim, Berlin, 7/24/1942, gez. Gödde.”

10 Adolf Hitler, Mein Kampf (Boston: Mariner, 1999), 307; al-Husaini, Mudhakkirat, 94, 414-415. 11 Hitler, Mein Kampf, 610, 619. 12.

12 Al-Husaini, Mudhakkirat, 73.

13 “Ein Angebot an die zuständigen Stellen in Deutschland,” Akten zur Deutschen Auswärtigen

Politik, 63 vols. (Baden-Baden: Imprimerie Nationale, 1950-1996), ser. D,5:655-656 (offer for agreement, nine points by the Grand Mufti and Syrian Arabs); “Islam und Judentum,” in Islam--Bolschewismus, ed. Muhammad Sabri (Berlin: Junker und Dünnhaupt, 1938), 22-32 (grand mufti’s call to the Islamic world of 1937).

14 PArchAA, N6, R104795, “Aufzeichnung, Empfang des Sondergesandten von König Abdul Aziz Ibn Saud auf dem Berghofe des Königlichen Rats Khalid Al Hudal-Qarqani, Berlin 20.06.1939, gez. Hentig.”

15 PArchWGS, Jewish Question, Hermann Göring to Reinhard Heydrich, Berlin, July 31, 1941, signed Göring.

16  PArchWGS,  Office  Of  Chief  Of  Counsel  For  War  Crimes,  Doc.  No.  NG-5462-5570, Eidesstattliche Erklärung (sworn statement on financial affairs of Germany’s Arab guests), Carl Rekowski, Bremen, October 5, 1947, 1-10.

17  Wolfgang G. Schwanitz, Gold, Bankiers und Diplomaten: Zur Geschichte der Deutschen Orientbank 1906-1946 (Berlin: Trafo, 2002), 100, 113, 148, 299.

18 Al-Husaini, Mudhakkirat, 104.

19 Ibid., 107.

20 Ibid., 105.

21 USArchII, T120, R901, F61123, “Entwurf eines dem Sekretär des Großmuftis mitzugebenden Schreibens im Namen des Führers als Antwort auf den Brief vom 20.01.1941, geheim, Berlin, März 1941 [later dated April 8, 1941], gez. Weizsäcker.”

22 German-Italian broadcast declaration on Arab independence, aired October 21, 1941.

23 USArchII, T120, R901, F61123, “Die Person des Großmufti, geheime Reichssache, Berlin, März 1941,” 72-73.

24 H. R. Trevor-Roper, Hitler’s Table Talk, 1941-1944, rev. ed. (New York: Enigma, 2008), 412.

25 USArchII, RG165, B3055, OSS code cablegram, “Grand Mufti, Cairo, confidential,” May 19, 1941.

26 USArchII, T120, R63571, R50682, “Der Großmufti von Jerusalem,” Berlin, 11/28/41”; al-Husaini, Mudhakkirat, 108.

27 Al-Husaini, Mudhakkirat, 113.

28 Ibid.

29 Trevor-Roper, Hitler’s Table Talk, 412.

30 BArchPAA, F56474, Bericht, 351003-351007.

31 Corry Guttstadt, Die Türkei, die Juden und der Holocaust (Hamburg: Assoziation A, 2008), 248, 256.

32 Ibid.

33 PArchWGS, protocol of the Wannsee Conference, Berlin-Wannsee, January 20, 1942, online at http://www.ghwk.de/fileadmin/user_upload/pdf-wannsee/protokoll-januar1942.pdf.

34 “Betr. Grossmufti von Jerusalem,” written statement by Wisliceny at Nuremberg, July 26, 1946, in Wolfgang G. Schwanitz,  Amin  al-Husaini  und  das  Dritte Reich(Lawrenceville, N.J., 2008),

http://www.trafoberlin.de/pdf-Neu/Amin%20al-

Husaini%20und%20das%20Dritte%20Reich%20WGS.pdf, 1-10.

35 Wolfgang G. Schwanitz: “Amin al-Husaini and the Holocaust: What Did the Grand Mufti Know?” World Politics Review Exclusive, May 8, 2008, http://www.trafoberlin.de/pdf-Neu/Amin%20al-Husaini%20and%20the%20Holocaust.pdf,1-10.

36 Schwanitz, Germany and the Middle East, 218-220.

37 Morsch and Ley, Das Konzentrationslager Sachsenhausen, 174.

38 PArchAA, R100702, F1784-85, Zu Pol VII 6447g II, B611976.

39 PArchAA, R100702, F1784-85, Zu Pol VII 6447g II, B611977.

40 Astrid Ley and Günther Morsch, eds., Medizin und Verbrechen: Das Krankenrevier des KZ Sachsenhausen 1936-1945 (Berlin: Metropol, 2007), 391-392. 

Hitler.

Citing relevant history is hardly inflammatory. Indeed, it’s extremely enlightening. What else could explain the virulence of Arab hatred toward Jews but idological interbreeding with Nazis?

 July 28, 2014

Abbas is proud of his role in the Munich Massacre.

Palestinian President Abbas: Paymaster of 1972 Munich Massacre Terrorists

Palestinian Authority Chairman Abbas financed the Abu Daoud/Black September terror call to murder 11 Israeli Olympic athletes in Munich in 1972.  Read the reports, then decide.

Wikipedia reports that:

“As a commander of Black September, Abu Daoud was the mastermind behind the Munich massacre. While he planned the operation, he did not personally take part in it. The day before the operation commenced on 5 September 1972, Abu Daoud briefed the assassination squad and issued final instructions over dinner in a restaurant at the Munich railway station. . .

“The Munich massacre was an attack during the 1972 Summer Olympics in Munich, West Germany, targetting 11 members of the Israeli Olympic team, who were taken hostage and eventually killed. . .  Shortly after the crisis began, they demanded the release of 234 prisoners held in Israeli jails. . .

“The following Israeli Olympians were murdered either by the terrorists themselves or in the attempt to free them:  Moshe Weinberg (age 33, wrestling coach); Yossef Romano (age 32, weightlifter); Ze’ev Friedman (age 28, weightlifter); David Berger (age 28, weightlifter); Yakov Springer (age 51, weightlifting judge); Eliezer Halfin (age 24, wrestler); Yossef Gutfreund (age 40, wrestling referee); Kehat Shorr (age 53, shooting coach); Mark Slavin (age 18, wrestler); Andre Spitzer (age 27, fencing coach); and Amitzur Shapira (age 40, track coach).

“In 1999, Daoud published “Memoirs of a Palestinian Terrorist,” in which Daoud describes how he planned and executed the 1972 Olympic attack where 11 Israeli athletes were murdered.  In 1999, Abu Daoud was awarded the Palestinian Prize for Culture for his book “Memoirs of a Palestinian Terrorist,” for which he received 10,000 French Francs as prize money.”

Despite having published his own public confession of the Munich terror attack, Daoud was not assassinated by Israel.

“According to Ankie Spitzer, widow of fencing coach Andre, ‘He [Abu Daoud] didn’t pay the price for what he did.’

In 2006, Abu Daoud gave several personal interviews after the release of the Steven Spielberg film ‘Munich’ revived discussions of the massacre. Abu Daoud remained unrepentant regarding his role in the Munich attacks, stating on Germany’s Spiegel TV, ‘I regret nothing. You can only dream that I would apologize.’

In an Associated Press interview, he [Abu Daoud] legitimized the operation given its success, declaring, ‘Before Munich, we were simply terrorists. After Munich, at least people started asking who are these terrorists? What do they want? Before Munich, nobody had the slightest idea about Palestine.’

Shortly before Daoud’s death, he said in a farewell statement to Israelis, ‘Today, I cannot fight you anymore, but my grandson will and his grandson too.’

Abu Daoud legitimized the operation given its success, declaring, ‘Before Munich, we were simply terrorists. After Munich, at least people started asking who are these terrorists? What do they want? Before Munich, nobody had the slightest idea about Palestine.’
Abu Daoud died on 3 July 2010 in Damascus, Syria, of natural causes of kidney failure at the age of 73.”

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Munich_massacre /http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Abu_Daoud

In the August 22, 2002 issue of Sports Illustrated (SI), in an article about Abu Daoud, entitled “The Mastermind” (meaning Daoud had already admitted in his 1999 “Memoirs of a Palestinian Terrorist” book that he was the mastermind, planner and architect of the 1972 Munich Olympic massacre of 11 Israeli Olympic athletes), SI reported the following:

“In late July, SI’s Don Yaeger went to the Middle East to find the 72-year-old Abu Daoud. After five days in Syria, where he met with leaders of several Palestinian groups, including the Palestinian Authority, PA president Yasir Arafat’s Fatah faction and the militant Hamas, Yaeger received a call from Abu Daoud, who said he was in Cyprus. Abu Daoud, who would not reveal where he resides—saying only that he lives with his wife on a pension provided by the PA—agreed to answer written questions. Among his claims, in his memoir and to SI, are these:

“Though he wasn’t involved in conceiving or implementing it, ‘the [ Munich] operation had the endorsement of Arafat.’ Arafat is not known to have responded to the allegations in Abu Daoud’s book. In May 1972 four Black Septembrists hijacked a Sabena flight from Brussels to Tel Aviv, hoping to free comrades from Israeli jails. But Israeli special forces stormed the plane, killing or capturing all the terrorists and freeing every passenger, leaving Arafat, by Abu Daoud’s account, desperate to boost morale in the refugee camps by showing that Israel was vulnerable.

“Though he didn’t know what the money was being spent for, longtime Fatah official Mahmoud Abbas, a.k.a. Abu Mazen [the current President of Palestine], was responsible for the financing of the Munich attack. Abu Mazen could not be reached for comment regarding Abu Daoud’s allegation.

“After Oslo in 1993, Abu Mazen went to the White House Rose Garden for a photo op with Arafat, President Bill Clinton and Israel’s Yitzhak Rabin and Shimon Peres. ‘Do you think that…would have been possible if the Israelis had known that Abu Mazen was the financier of our operation?’ Abu Daoud writes. ‘I doubt it.’ Today the Bush Administration seeks a Palestinian negotiating partner ‘uncompromised by terror,’ yet last year Abu Mazen met in Washington with Secretary of State Colin Powell.”

http://sportsillustrated.cnn.com/vault/article/magazine/MAG1026518/index.htm

On 3 July 2010, the then-Chairman of the Palestinian Authority/President of Palestine, Abbas wrote in a condolence letter to Daoud’s family, “He is missed. He was one of the leading figures of Fatah and spent his life in resistance and sincere work as well as physical sacrifice for the people’s just causes.”

The next day, 4 July 2010, Palestinian President Abbas made the following public announcement of condolences for Abu Daoud:

“The official PA daily:

Headline: ‘The President [Abbas] expresses condolences over the death of the fighters Muhammad Oudeh and Ja’afar Shadid…’

‘President Mahmoud Abbas sent a telegram of condolences yesterday over the death of the great fighter Muhammad Daoud Oudeh, ‘Abu Daoud,’ who died just before reaching 70. The telegram of condolences read: ‘The deceased was one of the prominent leaders of the Fatah movement and lived a life filled with the struggle, devoted effort, and the enormous sacrifice of the deceased for the sake of the legitimate problem of his people, in many spheres. He was at the forefront on every battlefield, with the aim of defending the [Palestinian] revolution. What a wonderful brother, companion, tough and stubborn, relentless fighter.’

[Al-Hayat Al-Jadida, July 4, 2010]”

http://palwatch.org/main.aspx?fi=157&doc_id=2531

So there you have it.  Palestine President Abbas was and is the unrepentant and proud bagman for one of the vilest Palestinian terrorist acts in the history of Israel.  Yet, the Israeli government is ceding him and his fellow-terrorists land from which they will attempt and G-d forbid, succeed in murdering more Jews.

For more information, please visit www.marklangfan.com

Cracking down on terror and violence is not loosing your humanity. It is called defending yourself, which any responsible human being would do - YJ Draiman

Cracking down on terror and violence is not loosing your humanity. It is called defending yourself, which any responsible human being would do.

Over the years Israel has bent over backwards to try and bring about peace and coexistence. All the concessions and appeasement has brought about more terror and more violence. When you educate your children and the masses to commit terror and violence, you have no option but to respond fiercely to terror and violence.
The Arab-Muslim world wherever they are there is strife and conflict.
Do you want to give up your freedom your way of life your security your family for the sake of Radical Islam? The answer is absolutely no!
I spend in Jerusalem over year completing the building of a 5 star hotel across from Jaffa gate, The Arabs were working in the building construction and their brethren were suicide bombing and blowing up busses with workers from the hotel construction dying in the process. Some Arab workers were intentionally damaging the construction.

Fighting terrorism is not unlike fighting a deadly cancer. It can not be treated just where it is visible – every diseased cell in the body must be destroyed completely with no traces left.
When a poison strikes the human body, the only way to address it, is to remove it and destroy it completely. That is the way the terrorist organizations should be treated.
YJ Draiman

Israel should send troops to arrest Abbas for inciting violence. He is not above the law - YJ Draiman

Israel should send troops to arrest Abbas for inciting violence. He is not above the law.

Any person or group who incites violence against the Jewish people must be declared an enemy of Israel and treated as such.

If the Arabs cannot live in peace with the Jews in Greater Israel, the only solution is to evict them to Jordan or Gaza. Enough is enough. It's time for Israel to take off the gloves and take the necessary steps to protect the Jewish people in Israel. One of the fundamental obligation of the government is to protect its citizens at all costs.

Israel must adopt a policy of zero tolerance. By pacifying the Arabs and the world nations, Israel's government is failing to take care of the Jewish people. It should not be necessary to remind the government that the Jewish people have suffered for over 2000 years at the hands of other people or nations who  terrorized the Jewish people in Diaspora.

Now the Jews in their own country must be protected at all costs. Israel has the power, means and resources to stop the ghetto mentality. Israel's government must overcome the leftist attitude and their delusional mentality, Israel must hit hard all terrorists and perpetrators of violence with a no reprieve, "damn the torpedoes" policy.

If the current government cannot protect its people, its time to change the government. Less talk and more action and results.

"In Israel; We have to undue and reverse the decades of nonsense that the peace industry has fermented, which led us to the position where the world thinks we the Jews are occupiers in our own ancestral land.
If something is false and it is repeated enough times it becomes sort of common wisdom.
We have to undo that."

Arab-Palestinians; you have to be a country first, which you are not, before you can be a country under occupation. Furthermore, the Arab-Palestinians have a State it is called Jordan which was created illegally from Jewish territory.

The UN cannot make a country for the Arab-Palestinians. They have no such authority under the UN Charter, Moreover, The UN cannot abrogate International law and treaties. The UN is only an advisory capacity and all UN resolutions must be accepted by all the parties in writing to be valid, The Arabs did not agree, therefore the resolutions have no meaning whatsoever.

Territories — Legality of Jewish Settlements

Border Changes As Arabs Initiate Wars of Aggression

In 1947 Jews accepted the UN “Partition Plan” that recommended a sovereign independent Jewish State. All Arab countries rejected the “Partition Plan,” and tried to wipe Israel off the face of the earth. Time and again Israel has returned land it gained in these Arab wars of aggression, in the hope that this will deliver peace and stability. It did not.

1. 
   1949
   Israel boundaries after Israel War of Independence.
2. 
   1956
   Sinai Campaign; Israel gains control over the Sinai Peninsular territory.
3. 
   1957
   Israel agrees to withdraws its troops from the Sinai Peninsular and the Gaza Strip, handing over these territories back to Egypt.
4. 
   1967
   Israel boundaries following the Six Day War. Egypt, Jordan and Syria in a war of aggression, loose the territories of the Sinai Peninsular, the West Bank and the Golan Heights. For the first time Israel is in control of Jewish Mandated Palestine.
5. 
   1973
   Israel boundaries following the Yom Kippur War. In a clear act of aggression Egypt and Syria attacked the State of Israel, but were driven away.
6. 
   1979 – Present
   On March 26, 1979, Israel and Egypt signed a peace treaty on the White House lawn. Israel returned the Sinai Peninsular territory to Egypt.

In advising that Jewish settlements are illegal, the ICJ went beyond its own mandate from the General Assembly without being asked to do so.

In paragraph 120 of the Court’s opinion, the ICJ declares:

“The Court concludes that the Israeli settlements in the Occupied Palestinian Territory (including East Jerusalem) have been established in breach of international law.”

The ICJ based its conclusion on the inappropriate use of an article of the Fourth Geneva Convention which stipulates:

“The Occupying Power shall not deport or transfer parts of its own civilian population into the territory it occupies.”

This was coupled with a host of anti-Israeli UN General Assembly resolutions passed in the 1990s that describe the West Bank and Gaza as “Palestinian Occupied Territories” and declare Israeli settlements – including hundreds of thousands of Jewish Jerusalemites living in numerous new neighborhoods built since 1967 – to be illegal settlers.

For example, in paragraph 19 of the opinion, the ICJ notes that in 1997 the Security Council rejected two one-sided draft resolutions that sought to brand Israeli settlements as illegal (draft S/1997/199¹ and draft S/1997/241²). The ICJ then proceeds to solemnly describe how “the Arab Group” maneuvered to by-pass the Security Council and to subsequently pass General Assembly Resolution ES-10/2 that “expressed its [General Assembly] conviction” and:

“… condemned the ‘illegal Israeli actions’ in occupied East Jerusalem and the rest of the Occupied Palestinian Territory, in particular the construction of settlements in that territory.”

The ICJ leads the reader to believe that expressing “conviction” in regard to the so-called “illegal Israeli actions in occupied East Jerusalem and the rest of the Occupied Palestinian Territory” is sufficient to make the document a source of law.

The General Assembly request of the ICJ’s advisory opinion reads:

“Recalling in particular relevant United Nations resolutions affirming that Israeli settlements in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, including East Jerusalem, are illegal and an obstacle to peace and to economic and social development as well as those demanding the complete cessation of settlement activities.”³

Again, the ICJ treats its reference to “United Nations Resolutions” as if it was a source of law, all without checking its accuracy or legal standing.

The UN Charter does not grant the General Assembly or the International Court of Justice the authority to assign or affect ‘ownership’ of the Territories.

As incredulous as it may be, the ICJ chose to ignore the actual powers vested in the UN General Assembly. A host of anti-Israel resolutions passed annually by the Assembly are not legally binding documents by any measure. One need only to read Article 10 of the UN Charter:

“The General Assembly may discuss any questions or any matters within the scope of the present Charter or relating to the powers and functions of any organs provided for in the present Charter, and, except as provided in Article 12, may make recommendations to the Members of the United Nations or to the Security Council or to both on any such questions or matters” [italics by author].

Schwebel, the former president of the International Court of Justice, has written that:

“… the General Assembly of the United Nations can only, in principle, issue ‘recommendations’ which are not of a binding character, according to Article 10 of the Charter of the United Nations.”⁴

Schwebel also cites the (1950) opinion of Judge, Sir Hersch Lauterpacht, a former member judge of the International Court of Justice, who declared that:

“… the General Assembly has no legal power to legislate or bind its members by way of recommendation.”

Yet, another former ICJ judge, Sir Gerald Fitzmaurice, has been just as resolute in rejecting what he labeled the “illusion” that a General Assembly resolution can have “legislative effect.”⁵

Academics and renowned international law experts also agree. Professor Stone illuminates this subject by pointing out:

“In his book The Normative Role of the General Assembly of the United Nations and the Declaration of Principles of Friendly Relations, Professor Gaetano Arangio-Ruiz⁶ is led to conclude that the General Assembly lacks legal authority either to enact or to ‘declare’ or ‘determine’ or ‘interpret’ international law so as legally to bind states by such acts, whether these states be members of the United Nations or not, and whether these states voted for or against or abstained from the relevant vote or did not take part in it.”⁷, ⁸

Certain General Assembly resolutions may be recognized as “declaratory,” but no more. Among Schwebel conclusions:

“… certain resolutions of the General Assembly – viewed as expressions of the assembled States of the world community … which treat questions of international law which are not the subject of principles found in the United Nations Charter may be recognized to be declaratory, though not creative, of international law, provided that they are:

(i) adopted with the support of all assembled States, or, at any rate, of all the groups of States represented in the General Assembly, including major States that are not members of a group, such as the United States of America and China.”

The Territories and the war of words.

One can easily trace the General Assembly’s attempts to legislate changes in the status of the Territories. How the definition of the status of the Territories was doctored is well documented on the website of the Palestinian delegation to the United Nations that posts landmark pro-Palestinian decisions. Examination reveals how over the years UN General Assembly resolutions and the wording of resolutions by sub-committees moves from “territories” to “occupied territories” to “Occupied Territories” and “Arab territories” to “occupied Palestinian territories” to “Occupied Palestinian Territory” and “occupied Palestinian territory, including Jerusalem”:

• Resolution 3236 (XXIX)⁹ passed in November 1974 speaks of “the question of Palestine”;
• Resolution 38/58¹⁰ in December 1983 speaks of “Arab territories” and “occupied territories”;
• Resolution 43/176¹¹ passed in December 1988 expresses sentiments suggesting Palestinian entitlement – speaking of “the Palestinian people[’s] right to exercise their sovereignty over their territory occupied since 1967”;
• Resolution 51/133¹² passed in December 1996 adds Jerusalem in particular – speaking of “occupied Palestinian territory, including Jerusalem, and the occupied Syrian Golan”;
• Resolution 52/250¹³ passed in July 1998 fully “assigns title” – speaking of “Occupied Palestinian Territory,” a designation that is frequently used in subsequent resolutions.

None of these terms have a legal foundation any more than declaring “the world is flat” makes it so. Yet, the International Court of Justice cites these terms as if they were legal documents, all in violation of the Court’s Statute.

It should be noted that the coining of the term “Occupied Palestinian Territory” by the General Assembly, and all the more so its ‘adoption’ by the International Court of Justice, is contrary to, and totally incompatible with, Article 12 of the UN Charter which states:

“While the Security Council is exercising in respect of any dispute or situation the functions assigned to it in the present Charter, the General Assembly shall not make any recommendation with regard to that dispute or situation unless the Security Council so requests” [italics by author].

International law allows for “just wars” and “lawful occupation.”

Resolutions 242 and 338 (discussed in Chapter 8) are the cornerstones for how a “just and lasting peace” should be achieved. The term ‘Occupied Palestinian Territory’ does not appear in either, not even the term ‘occupied territory.’ Resolution 242 affirms that:

“… fulfillment of the Charter principles requires the establishment of a just and lasting peace in the Middle East which should include the application of both the following principles: Withdrawal of Israeli armed forces from territories occupied in the recent conflict; Termination of all claims or states of belligerency and respect for and acknowledgement of the sovereignty, territorial integrity and political independence of every State in the area and their right to live in peace within secure and recognized boundaries free from threats or acts of force.”

The ICJ ignores that there is such a quality as a “lawful occupation.” In essence the ICJ seeks to overturn Security Council Resolutions 242 and 338, and to de-legitimize Israel’s right to claim any territory over the Green Line, even for self-defence.

In paragraph 74 of the opinion, the ICJ prefers a highly questionable, abridged rendition of these two core documents in a way that makes it appear as if Israel was an aggressor:

“On 22 November 1967, the Security Council unanimously adopted resolution 242 (1967), which emphasized [E.H., Principle I] the inadmissibility of acquisition of territory by war and [E.H., Principle II] called for the ‘Withdrawal of Israel armed forces from territories occupied in the recent conflict,’ and [E.H., Principle III] ‘Termination of all claims or states of belligerency.’”

ICJ selective writing falsifies historical documents.

The ICJ misleads the readers by simply removing from the second principle [Principle II above] the need, as stated in Resolution 242, for “secure and recognized boundaries” that will not invite aggression. In any case, the ICJ cannot override Security Council resolutions nor can it edit or fix them. Such doctored use of “the inadmissibility of the acquisition of territory by force” is disingenuous.

It is impossible to believe that the ICJ was unfamiliar with the basic rules governing the workings of the UN that are most relevant in understanding the meaning of the Security Council’s power and the two types of resolutions it may adopt:

Resolutions adopted under Chapter VI of the UN_Charter – Recommending “Pacific Resolution of Dispute”:

Resolutions the Security Council adopts under Chapter VI are intended to be followed and implemented via negotiated settlements between concerned parties. One of the UN resolutions adopted under Chapter VI of the UN Charter is Resolution 242, adopted after the 1967 Six-Day War. It calls on Israel and its Arab neighbours to accept the resolution through negotiation, arbitration and conciliation. Under Chapter VI of the UN Charter, the recommendations of UN Resolution 242 cannot be imposed on the parties concerned, as Arab leaders often argue. In fact, the title of Chapter VI also offers a clue to its nature, for it deals with “Pacific Resolution of Disputes.”

Resolutions adopted under Chapter VII of the UN Charter – Dealing with the “Threats to Peace …”:

In contrast, resolutions adopted by the Security Council under Chapter VII invest the Security Council with power to issue stringent resolutions that require nations to comply with the terms and directives set forth in the resolution. This leaves no room to negotiate a settlement with the affected parties. Thus, Chapter VII deals with “Threats to Peace, Breaches of the Peace and Acts of Aggression.”

When Iraq invaded Kuwait in 1990, the Security Council adopted resolutions under Chapter VII that only required the aggressor, Iraq, to comply.¹⁴

Had Israel been an aggressor – where the territories were “occupied territories” taken by force in an unjust war – Resolution 242 would have been adopted under Chapter VII of the UN Charter, requiring Israel to comply … and not under Chapter VI.

In paragraph 26 of its opinion, the ICJ notes that Chapter VII empowers the Security Council to “require enforcement by coercive action,” thusimplying that this Chapter is somehow relevant to these proceedings. Chapter VI isn’t even mentioned in the ICJ’s opinion – not in general and not with regard to Resolutions 242 or 338, although the Bench cites “242 (1967)” no less than seven times, providing ample opportunity to clarify that 242 adopted under Chapter VI of the UN Charter is intended to be followed and implemented via negotiated settlements between the concerned parties, and not by this Court.

Ignoring just wars and legal occupation.

It is important to note here that the ICJ refuses to even acknowledge the existence of scholarly literature that addresses the issue of seizure of territory in just wars written by internationally respected, former members of the ICJ. The ICJ simply turns a blind eye to the fact that some wars are just warsand not all occupations are illegal – as in the Israeli case, so clearly reflected by the unanimous adoption of UN Security Council Resolution 242 under Chapter VI.

As noted earlier, Lauterpacht pointed out in his writing that:

“… territorial change cannot properly take place as a result of the ‘unlawful’ use of force. But to omit the word ‘unlawful’ is to change the substantive content of the rule and to turn an important safeguard of legal principle into an aggressor’s charter. For if force can never be used to effect lawful territory change, then, if territory has once changed hands as a result of the unlawful use of force, the illegitimacy of the position thus established is sterilized by the prohibition upon the use of force to restore the lawful sovereign. This cannot be regarded as reasonable or correct.”¹⁵

This argument, which is widely recognised, goes unnoticed or is consciously and purposely ignored by the Court.

The ICJ’s sweeping ‘adoption’ of the General Assembly’s resolutions – as if they were legally binding or a source of international law – and the ICJ’s unauthorized ‘illegal transfer’ of unallocated disputed territories to one of the sides in the conflict, is all the more ironic in light of the ICJ’s main contention: that Israel’s actions are primarily political and not security motivated, and that these actions constitute a fait accompli, declaring in paragraph 121 of the opinion:

“The Court considers that the construction of the wall and its associated régime create a ‘fait accompli’ on the ground that could well become permanent, in which case, and notwithstanding the formal characterization of the wall by Israel, it would be tantamount to de facto annexation.”

This begs the question: Are the ICJ’s own actions in arbitrarily handing over ownership and title to all territories beyond the Green Line to the Palestinians – including East Jerusalem – not tantamount to unlawful de facto annexation?

Professor Stone cites in his writings that in 1975 the ICJ has been:

“insistent, not least as regards [to] questions of territorial title, that the rules and concepts of international law have to be interpreted ‘by reference to the law in force’ and ‘the State practice’ at the relevant period [italics by author].

“Judge de Castro in his Separate Opinion (ibid., 127, at 168 ff.) declared the principle tempus regit factum as a recognized principle of international law. He continued (p. 169): ‘Consequently, the creation of ties with or titles to a territory must be determined according to the law in force at the time. ... The rule tempus regit factum must also be applied to ascertain the legal force of new facts and their impact on the existing situation.’ He went on to illustrate this influence of ‘new facts and new law’ by reference to the impact on the suppression of the colonial status of Western Sahara by the principles concerning non-self-governing territories emanating from the United-Nations Charter and the later application to them of the principle of Self-determination (pp. 169-71). This limiting rider has reference to the appearance of new principles of international law, overriding the different principles on which earlier titles are based. But, of course, it can have no application to vested titles based, as was the very territorial allocation between the Jewish and Arab peoples, on the principle of self-determination itself.”¹⁶

If the so-called West Bank and Gaza were indeed occupied territory – belonging to someone else and unjustly seized by force – there could be no grounds for negotiating new borders, as UN Security Council Resolution 242 implies.

The ICJ charges that Jewish settlements in the West Bank are populated by settlers ‘deported by force.’

Once the ICJ has ‘established evidence’ that the West Bank and Gaza are unlawfully occupied territories, it then applies this status to the Fourth Geneva Conference¹⁷ de jure, stating in paragraph 120 of the opinion that:

“As regards these settlements, the Court notes that Article 49, paragraph 6, of the Fourth Geneva Convention provides: ‘The Occupying Power shall not deport or transfer parts of its own civilian population into the territory it occupies.’

“In this respect, the information provided to the Court shows that, since 1977, Israel has conducted a policy and developed practices involving the establishment of settlements in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, contrary to the terms of Article 49, paragraph 6, just cited” [italics by author].

One can hardly believe this baseless ICJ assertion that Israel used “deportation” and “forced transfer” of its own population into “occupied territories.”

The Court attempts to broaden the definition of Article 49 to possibly ‘fit’ some wrong doing on the part of the State of Israel, all with no reference to law, adding:

“That provision prohibits not only deportations or forced transfers of population such as those carried out during the Second World War, but also any measures taken by an occupying Power in order to organize or encourage transfers of parts of its own population into the occupied territory.”

In the above conclusion, the ICJ fails to disclose the content of the “information provided” (information the Court based its decision on), and theanonymous ‘authorities’ that provided such. Anyone interested in the subject at hand is aware of the difficulties the Israeli Government faces in its decision to relocate some Israeli settlements out of the “Territories,” a fact that seems to be contrary to the “information provided” to the ICJ.

Professor Stone touches on the applicability of Article 49 of the Geneva Convention. Writing on the subject in 1980:

“… that because of the ex iniuria principle, Jordan never had nor now has any legal title in the West Bank, nor does any other state even claim such title. Article 49 seems thus simply not applicable. (Even if it were, it may be added that the facts of recent voluntary settlements seem not to be caught by the intent of Article 49 which is rather directed at the forced transfer of the belligerent’s inhabitants to the occupied territory, or the displacement of the local inhabitants, for other than security reasons.) The Fourth Geneva Convention applies only, according to Article 2, to occupation of territory belonging to ‘another High Contracting Party’; and Jordan cannot show any such title to the West Bank, nor Egypt to Gaza.”

Support to Stone’s assertion can be found in Lauterpacht’s writing in 1968:

“Thus Jordan’s occupation of the Old City–and indeed of the whole of the area west of the Jordan river–entirely lacked legal justification; and being defective in this way could not form any basis for Jordan validly to fill the sovereignty vacuum in the Old City [and whole of the area west of the Jordan river].”¹⁸

Rostow concludes that the Convention is not applicable to Israel’s legal position and notes:

“The opposition to Jewish settlements in the West Bank also relied on a legal argument – that such settlements violated the Fourth Geneva Convention forbidding the occupying power from transferring its own citizens into the occupied territories. How that Convention could apply to Jews who already had a legal right, protected by Article 80 of the United Nations Charter, to live in the West Bank, East Jerusalem, and the Gaza Strip, was never explained.”¹⁹

It seems that the International Court of Justice “never explained” it either.

By default, ICJ support of the “Mandate for Palestine” suggests it is actually supporting Jewish settlement in Palestine. Is the ICJ confused?

The ICJ concluded that under the Fourth Geneva Conference, Jewish settlements in the “Territories” are illegal, which brings up the need to reconcile two of the ICJ’s conflicting positions:

The first, as noted above, is the ICJ opinion regarding the illegal Jewish settlements in the “Territories.”

The second, refers to the ICJ ‘adoption’ of the “Mandate for Palestine” – a document which under Article 6 testifies to the legality of Jewish settlements in Palestine that:

“encourage, in co-operation with the Jewish agency referred to in Article 4, [building] close settlement by Jews on the land, including State lands and waste lands not required for public purposes”²⁰ [italics by author].

The ICJ ignores that under both international convention²¹ and Article 80 of the UN Charter, all of western Palestine is legally open to settlement by Jews, and at best, the West Bank and Gaza are unallocated territory left over from the British Mandate to which there are two claimants.

Paragraph 88 of the Court’s opinion stated that:

“… the ultimate objective of the sacred trust” referred to in Article 22, paragraph 1, of the Covenant of the League of Nations “was the self-determination … of the peoples concerned.”

The ICJ seems confused. It attempts to links the “sacred trust” to the wrong “people concerned”!

UN Charter and Article 80.

International law, the UN Charter, and specifically Article 80 of the UN Charter implicitly recognize the “Mandate for Palestine” of the League of Nations. This Mandate granted Jews the irrevocable right to settle in the area of Palestine, anywhere between the Jordan River and the Mediterranean Sea. Rostow explains:

“This right is protected by Article 80 of the United Nations Charter. The Mandates of the League of Nations have a special status in international law, considered to be trusts, indeed ‘sacred trusts.’

“Under international law, neither Jordan nor the Palestinian Arab ‘people’ of the West Bank and the Gaza Strip have a substantial claim to the sovereign possession of the occupied territories.”²²

It is interesting to learn how Article 80 made its way into the UN Charter. Professor Rostow recalls:

“I am indebted to my learned friend Dr. Paul Riebenfeld, who has for many years been my mentor on the history of Zionism, for reminding me of some of the circumstances which led to the adoption of Article 80 of the Charter. Strong Jewish delegations representing differing political tendencies within Jewry attended the San Francisco Conference in 1945. Rabbi Stephen S. Wise, Peter Bergson, Eliahu Elath, Professors Ben-Zion Netanayu and A. S. Yehuda, and Harry Selden were among the Jewish representatives. Their mission was to protect the Jewish right of settlement in Palestine under the mandate against erosion in a world of ambitious states. Article 80 was the result of their efforts.”

The ICJ ignores the history of Jewish life in the area called Palestine.

The ICJ also ignores that Jews who had settled in these areas during almost 30 years of “Mandate” government and, in fact, for thousands of years in areas such as Hebron and the Old City of Jerusalem (in so-called “East Jerusalem”), in Kfar Darom in Gaza or the Etzion Bloc near Hebron, were either killed or driven out by the Arabs during the 1948 War. All areas of western Palestine that remained under Arab control were rendered racially cleansed of Jews – by Jordanian and Egyptian invaders, an act that in today’s parlance would be labeled “ethnic cleansing.” Even the 2,000 Jewish inhabitants of the Jewish Quarter of the Old City [of Jerusalem], who lived adjacent to the holiest site to Judaism, the Western Wall in the shadow of the Temple Mount, were an intolerable presence to Arabs.

While the ICJ opinion mentions Jerusalem 54 times, all references are in relation to Palestinian rights of free access to holy sites. The ICJ ignores the fact that not one Jew was allowed to reside or even visit the West Bank and the Old City of Jerusalem for 19 years of illegal Jordanian rule. Between 1949 and 1967, Jordanian military personnel overran and razed Jewish settlements to the ground, trashed some 58 synagogues, and used headstones from the Mount of Olives cemetery to build roads.²³ After the 1967 Six-Day War, Jews reestablished their legal right to settle anywhere in western Palestine – an entitlement unaltered in international law since 1920 and valid to this day.

Invoking the Fourth Geneva Convention to make any Jewish presence in the West Bank, including the Old City of Jerusalem, ‘illegal’ is hardly applicable – neither from an historical, nor from a legal standpoint.

Where Jews are and are not permitted to settle.

The ICJ chooses to ignore the content of the “Mandate for Palestine” and accompanying legally binding international accords that set the boundaries of the Jewish mandate and delineate where Jews are and are not permitted to settle.

The Court opinion cites in paragraph 70 – almost parenthetically – that:

“The territorial boundaries of the Mandate for Palestine were laid down by various instruments, in particular on the eastern border by a British memorandum of 16 September 1922 and an Anglo-Transjordanian Treaty of 20 February 1928.”

The reader is left in the dark as to what these “instruments” say or to what the text refers. No wonder. The ICJ does not quote the content of these two key international treaties and ignores the relevant clauses of the Mandate itself vis-à-vis the status of western Palestine, because citing these treaties and clauses would collapse the foundations of the commonly-held assumption that Israeli settlements are ‘illegal’. It is important to set the record straight. The “eastern border” the ICJ chose not to discuss was the Jordan River.

At first, the six page “Mandate” document did not set the borders – leaving this for the Mandator to stipulate in a binding appendix to the document in the form of a memorandum, but Article 6 of the Mandate says clearly:

“The Administration of Palestine, while ensuring that the rights and position of other sections of the population are not prejudiced, shall facilitate Jewish immigration under suitable conditions and shall encourage, in co-operation with the Jewish agency referred to in Article 4,close settlement by Jews on the land, including State lands and waste lands not required for public purposes” [italics by author].

Article 25 of the “Mandate for Palestine” entitled the Mandatory to change the terms of the Mandate in the part of the Mandate east of the Jordan River. That is, it gave the Mandatory an ‘escape clause’ that was not applicable to western Palestine:

“In the territories lying between the Jordan and the eastern boundary of Palestine as ultimately determined, the Mandatory shall be entitled, with the consent of the Council of the League of Nations, to postpone or withhold application of such provision of this Mandate as he may consider inapplicable to the existing local conditions, …”²⁴

Great Britain activated this option in the above-mentioned memorandum of September 16 1922, which the Mandatory sent to the League of Nations and which the League subsequently approved – making it a legally binding integral part of the Mandate.

Thus the “Mandate for Palestine” brought to fruition a fourth Arab state east of the Jordan River, realized in 1946 when the Hashemite Kingdom of Trans-Jordan was granted independence from Great Britain. All the clauses concerning a Jewish homeland would not apply to this part (Trans-Jordan) of the original Mandate, stating clearly:

“The following provisions of the Mandate for Palestine are not applicable to the territory known as Trans-Jordan, which comprises all territory lying to the east of a line drawn from … up the centre of the Wady Araba, Dead Sea and River Jordan. … His Majesty’s Government accept[s] full responsibility as Mandatory for Trans-Jordan.”

The creation of an Arab state in eastern Palestine (today Jordan) on 77 percent of the land mass of the original Mandate for Jews, in no way changed the status of Jews west of the Jordan River and their right to settle anywhere in western Palestine, between the Jordan River and the Mediterranean Sea.

These documents are the last legally binding documents regarding the status of what is commonly called “the West Bank and Gaza.”

The memorandum (regarding Article 25) is also the last modification of the Mandate on record²⁵ by the League of Nations or by its legal successor – the United Nations – in accordance with Article 27 of the Mandate that states unequivocally:

“The consent of the Council of the League of Nations is required for any modification of the terms of this mandate.”

But to note or to quote these documents would ‘spoil’ the ICJ’s charge that Israeli settlements are “illegal” and that Israel is an unlawful “occupying power” of land that ‘belongs’ to Palestinian Arabs.

The ICJ even uses its own opinions in a selective manner. Under the mistaken assumption that Palestinian self-determination was set in stone by the international community in 1922 by the Mandate for Palestine, the Bench quotes a previous opinion on Namibia that addresses the fate of League of Nations’ mandates, stating in paragraph 70 of the opinion:

“…two principles were considered to be of paramount importance: the principle of non-annexation and the principle that the well-being and development of … peoples [not yet able to govern themselves] form[ed] ‘a sacred trust of civilization.’”²⁶

The term “sacred trust” quoted by the ICJ is borrowed from the United Nations Charter Article 73²⁷ which recognizes the UN’s commitments of its predecessor – the League of Nations – and promises to carry through to fruition the mandate system the League of Nations created, enshrined in Article 22 of the League of Nations Charter. Thus, the Bench quotes from its own 1950 opinion when it believes it supports the Palestinian cause, but the Bench also fails to mention that in the same case under the ICJ Advisory Opinion of 21 June 1971, the ICJ says:

“…The International Court of Justice has consistently recognized that the Mandate survived the demise of the League [of Nations]” [italics by author].

In other words, neither the ICJ nor the General Assembly can arbitrarily change the status of Jewish settlement as set forth in the “Mandate for Palestine,” an international accord that was never amended.

All of western Palestine, from the Jordan River to the Mediterranean Sea, including the West Bank and Gaza, remains open to Jewish settlement under international law until a legally binding document – in Israel’s case, a peace treaty between Arabs and Jews that was called for in Security Resolution 242 and 338 – changes this.

Rostow’s position concurred with the ICJ’s opinion as to the “sacredness” of such trusts:

“A trust” – as in Article 80 of the UN Charter (which the Court avoids to mention) – “does not end because the trustee dies … the Jewish right of settlement in the whole of western Palestine – the area West of the Jordan – survived the British withdrawal in 1948. … They are parts of the mandate territory, now legally occupied by Israel with the consent of the Security Council.”²⁸

The Oslo Accords and the Gaza-Jericho agreements recognize Israel legal presence in the “Territories.”

Even the Oslo Accords do not forbid either Israeli (i.e., Jewish) or Arab settlement activity. Likewise, the ICJ does not consider it relevant that the propriety of a security fence around Gaza was written into the Gaza-Jericho agreement, between Israel and the PLO, signed in Cairo, May 4 1994, and that Israel retained the right to provide for security, including the security of Israeli settlers.

“The Parties agree that, as long as this Agreement is in force, the security fence erected by Israel around the Gaza Strip shall remain in place and that the line demarcated by the fence, as shown on attached map No. 1, shall be authoritative only for the purpose of this Agreement”²⁹ [italics by author].

The ICJ’s narrative of how the Territories came into the possession of Israel is void of any context and sanitized of any trace of past and present Arab aggression.

The backdrop to the 1967 Six-Day War – the expulsion by Egypt of UN peace-keepers from the Sinai Peninsula, Egypt’s illegal blockade of an international waterway, the massing of Egyptian troops on Israel’s borders, and Jordan attacking the Israeli-held part of Jerusalem – mysteriously disappears from the ICJ’s narrative. The ICJ jumps from the signing of the 1948 armistice agreements that established the Green Line as a temporary border, to the aftermath of the 1967 Six-Day War in one step. Paragraph 72 of the opinion recounts how:

“By resolution 62 (1948) of 16 November 1948, the Security Council decided that ‘an armistice shall be established in all sectors of Palestine’ and called upon the parties directly involved in the conflict to seek agreement to this end. … The Demarcation Line was subject to such rectification as might be agreed upon by the parties.”³⁰

Paragraph 73 of the Court’s opinion immediately follows, saying:

“In the 1967 armed conflict, Israeli forces occupied all the territories which had constituted Palestine under British Mandate (including those known as the West Bank, lying to the east of the Green Line).”

Readers might think that Israel just woke up one morning and out of the blue attacked its neighbors and occupied part of their territory without provocation. In fact, both the events and UN resolutions of the period substantiate and recognize that Israel’s presence in the West Bank and Gaza is a legal occupation, and a result of Arab aggression.

The Principal Allied Powers and the League of Nations recognized Jewish historical rights to the land of Palestine.

Mandate for Palestine document, 1920:

“Whereas recognition has thereby been given to the historical connection of the Jewish people with Palestine and to the grounds for reconstituting their national home in that country …”

Report on the economic and commercial situation of Palestine, 1921:

“… Jews throughout the world would be able to see one country in which their race had a political and a spiritual home, in which, perhaps, the Jewish genius might repeat the services it had rendered to mankind from the same soil long ago” [italics by author].

Report of The High Commissioner of Palestine, 1920-1925:

“Jewish National Home in Palestine … should be formally recognised to rest upon [Jewish] ancient historic connection … fervid imaginations saw a rapid occupation of the country by great numbers of Jews, hurrying from the lands in which they were oppressed, the consequent creation, within a few years, of a Jewish State, the sudden fulfillment in almost apocalyptic fashion of the most far reaching of the ancient prophecies. … Among the eight millions of Jews in Eastern Europe … Palestine makes to them a most powerful appeal; they wish particularly to contribute to the productiveness of Palestine and above all to help to recreate in Palestine a people of Jewish agriculturists” [italics by author].

Palestine Royal Commission report, July 1937:

“… [The Jewish people] should know that it is in Palestine as of right and not on sufferance … and that it should be formally recognized torest upon ancient historic connection” [italics by author].